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Supervised by Professor Hani Sayed
ABSTRACT
Do public law judges play a role in public economic policies in Egypt? Egypt has
witnessed rough changes, leading to the adoption of different public economic policies.
Public law judges have played a key role in these economic shifts. However, the efficacy
of this role is pending on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the government with the
courts and the judicial decisions. This paper argues that the government posses the upper
hand in dealing with the judicial influence in economic issues in Egypt. The paper
scrutinizes the transformation in the judicial attitude towards government economic
policies. Specifically, the paper demarcates the extent to which the role of the public law
judge has affected the public economic policies in Egypt, and portrays the reaction of the
government towards the effects of these rulings. This paper argues that the government
views courts’ judgments according to its own economic policies. Practically, the
government will appreciate courts’ judgments if courts confer legitimacy on the
controversial economic policies of the government, or if the judicial intervention is
compatible with the government economic directions, while the government will hinder
the impact of courts’ contributions if the courts’ decisions go against its willingness. In
that case, the government can reverse court policy through enacting legislation that
deprives courts’ judgments from its crucial effects or restricts the scope of the judicial
review of the public law judge itself. To that end, the paper highlights the Supreme
Constitutional Courts’ rulings in the economic sphere and how the court helped the
regime dismantle the legal infrastructure of the socialist economic era in order to pave the
way for the implementation of the new-liberal economic policies. In the same context, the
Council of State Courts issued many noticeable judgments that annulled many
privatization contracts for illegality and corruptions in a way that touched the essence of
the neo-liberalism system. The paper also argues that Law No.32 of the year 2014 is an
explicit example for how the government determines the limits and extent of the judicial
influence in economic sphere in order to secure its economic policies.
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I.

Introduction
Undoubtedly, the real achievement of economic sustainable development of any state requires
fruitful collaboration between the three branches of government: the executive, legislative, and
judicial. Traditionally, courts are seen as independent platforms for reconciling conflicts between
litigants, but they also have the ability to intervene in the public policy arena to weigh best
priorities for the entire society.

Courts are an active player in determining public policy. In this regard, Neal Tate and Torbjorn
Vallinder noted that “Judicialization of politics may be or may become one of the most trends in
late- twentieth and early -twenty-first-century government.”1 The “Judicialization of politics” has
become a recognizable worldwide phenomenon that has resulted in the participation of the courts
besides administrators and legislators in identifying the fundamental economic, political, and
social basics of the state. On contrast, in his influential work on the role of the Supreme Court in
American democracy, Dahl argued that the Court is rarely played that role. In this regards, Dahl
stated that
The Supreme Court is inevitably a part of a dominant national alliance. As an element in
the political leadership of the dominant alliance the Court of course supports the major
policies of the alliance. By itself the Court is almost powerless to affect national policy.
In the absence of substantial agreement within the alliance any attempt by the Court to
make national policy is likely to lead to disaster.2
The role of the Egyptian public law judges is extremely perceptible. In Egypt, Public law judges
act as gatekeepers of the rule of law. Currently, the authority of judicial review in the Egyptian
legal system is divided between the Supreme Constitutional Court for constitutional matters on
the one hand, and the Council of State for administrative controversies on the other. The public

1

- THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER ,5(NEAL TATE, TORBJORN VALLINDER ed.,New
York University Press, 1995); The judicialization of politics should normally means either (1) the expansion of the
province of the courts or the judges at the expense of the politicians and/or the administrators, that is, the transfer of
decision-making rights from the legislature, the cabinet, or the civil service to the Courts, at least, (2) the spread of
judicial decision-making methods outside the judicial province proper. In summing up we might say that
judicialization essentially involves turning something into a form judicial process, TORBJORN VALLINDER,
“When The Courts Go Marching in”, THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER ,13 (New York
University Press, ed.1, 1995).
2
- Robert A. Dahl, Decision-making in a democracy: The Supreme Court as a national policy-maker, 6 J. Pub. L.
293(1957).
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law judge plays a prominent role in the decision-making process through reviewing the
constitutionality of legislation and the legality of administrative acts and contracts.
Despite the fact that courts have the power to intervene in the public policy field to assess the
best solutions for the whole society, the question that has received great concern is how public
law judges are able to implement this function in practice. This question is crucial because
indisputable reality concerning constitutional review and legality review is that courts with the
authority to strike down legislation or annul administrative decisions must depend on the
willingness of the government to enforce their judicial verdicts because they require a legislative
or an administrative intervention. Thus, in this context, Hamilton argues in Federalist 78 that the
judiciary "must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments"3

The current legal situation in Egypt has witnessed a considerable intervention of public law
judges in the public economic policies of the state. No can deny the fact that the Egyptian public
law judge is sometimes entitled to provide remedies for crucial economic dilemmas, whether
through providing sufficient guarantees to investors, paving the way to adopt new economic
approaches, or disclosing the deficiencies and irregularities of the implemented public economic
policies. However, the government tremendously determines the influence of the public law
judge role in the economic arena. Indeed, the government has the entire discretion in dealing
with courts’ contributions in economic dilemmas in Egypt.
Practically, the government will highly appreciate courts’ judgments if courts confer legitimacy
on the controversial economic policies of the government, or these judgments are compatible
with the government economic directions, while the government will hinder the influence of
courts’ contributions if the courts’ decisions go against its economic perspectives. In that case,
the government can reverse court policy through enacting legislation that deprives courts’
judgments from its crucial effects or restricts the scope of the judicial review of the public law
judge itself.

3

- ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, THE FEDERALIST No. 78, (Ian Shapiro, ed ,New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

2

Up to the present time, the Supreme Constitutional Court and the Council of State Courts have
become principle platforms for Egyptian citizens dissatisfied with the public economic policies
and seeking adoption of other economic approaches to ameliorate economic pressures. Since its
establishment in 1979, The Supreme Constitutional Court has played a key role in the Egyptian
economic sphere. The judicial activism of the Supreme Constitutional Court has legitimated the
government’s policy to overturn the socialist principles that shaped Egyptian development
policies since 1952.
Moreover, since the 25th January 2011 Revolution, the Council of State has issued many
controversial judgments that have annulled privatization contracts between the state and its
public institutions and national or foreign investors based on their illegality, corruption, and
squandering of public funds. Consequently, the government issued Law No.32 of the year 2014,
named “Regulating Some Procedural Aspects of Challenging Government Contracts”. This law
has limited the right to challenge government contracts to the state and the investors in a way
that hinders the Council of State from exercising its judicial oversight of government contracts in
so doing diminished its participation in shaping the public economic policies.4

The paper is an effort to provide important insights into the extent and the limits of the Egyptian
judicial influence in public economic policies. This paper shows that the government posses the
legal and administrative mechanisms to demarcate the limits and the impact of the role played by
public law judges in public economic policies in Egypt.

This paper overviews the legal infrastructure that was established during each economic epoch in
various aspects including the motives, regulatory framework, and actual application of each
policy. Then the paper moves to provide an overview of the creation of judicial review in Egypt
and its development in order to effectively understand the public law judges’ role in terms of
imposing their judicial oversight on the public economic policies since the Republic was

4

- Law No. 32 of April 22, 2014 on Regulating Certain Procedures for Challenging State Contracts. InEgy OG of
April 23, 2014, no. 16 bis (c). This law was issued by interim President Adly Mansour in 2014 in the absence of the
Parliament which was dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court in May 2012. This law has been accepted after
the parliamentary election in 2015 after a strong debate between parliament members.
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proclaimed in 1952 until now. The significance of this paper stems from that it presents a
historical overview of the relationship between the Egyptian public law judge and government
with respect to the economic policies since the proclaiming of the Republic in 1952 until now.
The paper precisely compares the role played by public law judges when the government decided
to implement a major shift in the economic policies, and portrays governmental reaction to
judicial rulings on the economic sphere.

To build these arguments, part II presents a historical overview of the public economic policies
in Egypt and how the government economic policies have evolved since the adoption of socialist
policies in 1952 to the implementation of the neoliberal economic reform in the early 1990s. Part
III highlights judicial review of public economic policies since the Republic was proclaimed in
1952 until the issuance of Law No.32 of the year 2014. The first part of this chapter explores the
creation and nature of judicial review in Egypt. The second part examines why the role of the
public law judge in reviewing public economic policies had been slight. In addition, the third
part illustrates the role of the Supreme Constitutional Court in reviewing the public economic
policies especially those related to Nasser’s era. The fourth part examines the Council of State
rulings in privatization cases and presents an entire analysis of these judgments and their impact
on the investment climate. Finally, this chapter also discusses Law No.32 of the year 2014 and
its crucial impact on the Council of State judicial review on public economic policies with a brief
commentary on the constitutionality of this law.

4

II. Historical Overview of Economic Development Policy
This chapter provides a cursory description the development of economic policies since the
adoption of socialist policies in 1952 to the implementation of the neoliberal economic reform in
the early 1990s. This brief description provides the backdrop against which we can track the
change in the Court’s attitude towards economic policies.

A. Developmentalism (1952-1970).
After the 1952 Free Officers' Revolution, the Egyptian Republic was proclaimed and Abdel
Nasser became the new president of the State. During Abdel Nasser’s era, after the British
military existence in the Egyptian territories came to an end in 1954, the economic role of the
government was mainly directed to invest only in the infrastructure in traditional areas like
irrigation and land reclamation. Meanwhile, the private sector led the main productive sectors in
the economy like agriculture, banking, insurance, and internal and foreign trade.5 The
government was convinced by the prominent role of the private sector in the first years of the
revolution to drive the vehicle of the economic progress of the state. Officials worked on
reinforcing the efficiency of private enterprises.6 The government passed legislation that granted
seven-year tax exemption to private investments in all sectors of the economy.7

According to Khalid Ikram, the agrarian reform was the most important procedure imposed on
the private sector in this period. Nasser responded to calls for economic reform in favor of
peasants and workers.8 Based on the Agrarian Reform Law thousands of hectares were seized
from feudal lords and redistributed to landless peasants.9 The new Ministry of Agrarian Reform
was responsible for the redistribution process. The land reform program led to the establishment
of the agriculture cooperatives. These cooperatives were responsible for setting plans concerning
crop rotation, marketing, and pricing and peasants had to abide by their directions and rules.

5

- KHALID IKRAM, THE EGYPYIIAN ECONOMY, 1952-2000: PERFORMANCE POLICIES AND ISSUES, 2
(Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Economies, ed.1) (2005).
6
- Id, at 2.
7
- TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 58 (Cambridge University Press, ed.1) (2007).
8
-. Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 3.
9
- Law no. 178 of September 9, 1952 on Agrarian Reform (El Aslah el zir’ay). In Egy OG of September 9, 1952, no.
131, p. 2. Land reform is a social economic program based on expropriating land properties from feudal lords and
selling it back to poor farmers cheaply.
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These cooperatives disclosed Nasser’s intention to enlarge the role of the state in the economy.10
Later on, the regime gradually began to shift the economic policies of the country from pure
capitalism to a more state- owned economy.

In the meantime, the government was keen to detach the country from colonial economy through
establishing the national industrialization (Developmentalism).11 This project was known as
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Nasser believed that the state should play an
increasingly active role in the economy through directly investing in productive and service
ventures, and controlling and monopolizing many economic sub-sectors to promote a huge
industrial development. Although such policy achieved high rates of economic growth at the
early stages, the situation changed after short period due to the fragmentation of the public sector
into personal networks, international politics, and finally the absence of economic priorities.12

According to Lama Abu Odeh, Nasser drafted his industrialization plan on the creation of huge
public sector rather than taking macroeconomic measures that could reinforce domestic industry,
as happened in The East Asian Tigers.13 Concurrently, the government established the National
Planning Committee to articulate the social and economic development that depended on the
state institutions and moved away from relying on the private enterprises.14 Besides, as a reaction
to the Suez Canal War, Egypt started to nationalize the French, British, and Belgian companies
and assets.15
On the same level, nationalization was one of the main aspects of Nasser’s regime. The entire
private sector was virtually nationalized to be managed under state control. Nationalization,
theoretically, is a governmental economic strategy that means the transfer of the ownership of
private enterprises to the state in return for compensation in order to promote the public interest
for the whole society.16 Practically, the process of nationalization was always articulated
10

- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 3.
- Lama Abu-Odeh, On Law and The Transition to Market: The Case of Egypt 37 Int'l J. Legal Info. 59(2009).
12
- Id, at 67.
13
-. Id.
14
- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 5.
15
- Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7, at 60.
16
-FAROUQ ABDEL BUR, THE ROLE OF MAGLS EL DAWLA IN PROTECTING PUBLIC RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS ( Dor Majlis Al Dowal fi Hamya al hokok w al horyat al a’ma) (Arabic) (1991).
11
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according to a law issued by the President who also took over the legislative authority in this
period due to the absence of parliamentary life after the dissolution of the political parties. Every
law issued specified the regulations, conditions, and the new legal framework of the nationalized
assets. Both laws established assessment committees that were responsible for determining the
amount of compensation that could be paid to the owners of the nationalized assets.

The first step was when Bank Misr and the National Bank were nationalized in 1960. Bank Misr
was one of the most profitable holding companies in this era whose 29 affiliated companies
accounted for 20 % of industrial output in Egypt.17 Subsequently, the huge waves of
nationalization occurred 1961 according to Law No.117of the year 1961 and Law No.71of the
year 1963.18 As a result, the entire cotton industry became under government power, in June
1961. Subsequently, private banks and forty-four companies in a variety of industries such as,
electricity, cement, and copper, were nationalized.19 Besides nationalization, Nasser rendered
legislations that gave the regime the authority to sequestrate or expropriate private enterprises
based on state of emergency and transfer its ownership to the state in return of compensation.20

Nasser adopted socialist strategies to redistribute resources from elite classes to the whole nation.
Constitutionally, the 1964 Constitution affirmed the socialistic nature of the economy in this era
and the intervention of the government throughout the economy. Article 9 of the Constitution
states that “The economic basis of the state is the socialistic system precluding exploitation and
ensuring the establishment of the communal society founded on sponsorship and justice.”21
Art.10 states that “The economic policies should be articulated in accordance with the
development plan drafted by the state.”22

17

- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 6.
- Law no. 117 of July 20, 1961 on Nationalization of Private Companies (Ta’mem Ba’d EL Monsh’at w El
Sharakat). InEgy OG of July 20, 1961, no. 162, art.2, art.3; Law no. 72 of August 20, 1963 on Nationalization of
Private Companies (Ta’mem Ba’d EL Monsh’at w El Sharakat). In Egy OG of August 8, 1963, no. 177, art,2, art.3.
19
- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at, 7
20
- Law no. 150 of March 24, 1964 on Sequestration of Private Companies (Rafaa’Al- Harasa A’n Ba’d EL AlAshakas ). InEgy OG of March 24, 1964, no. 69; art.3.
21
- Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (DusturJumhuriya tMisr al-Arabiyah) [Egy const.] of March 24,
1964, sec. I, art. 9. InEgy OG of March 25, 1964, vol. 99 bis (a), p. 1; free translation by the author.
22
- Egy 1964 Const, art. 10; free translation by the author.
18

7

Moreover, Nasser issued the National Charter or al-mithaq-al watany which encompassed all
socialist approaches that were embraced by policy makers in this period. The Charter contained
economic guidelines which portrayed tasks that must be performed by public institutions in order
to attain their desired economic perspectives. According to this document, the state was totally
responsible for driving the process of economic development. Additionally, the state had the
upper hand concerning the essential infrastructure of the economy. Moreover, the banking
system was publicly owned.23

In the short term, after the waves of nationalizations were implemented, the Egyptian economy
achieved reasonable rapid and sustained growth. The GDP growth rate increased from 5.3% per
year during 1956-1961 to 6.1% per year during 1961-1966. But these early encouraging rates did
not last, and the country was plagued by economic turmoil.24 Poor administration of the
nationalized assets and the government bureaucracy did not provide the efficiency needed for
sustained growth.25 Added to these inefficiencies, the country’s subsidies for various forms of
goods and services and the high costs incurred by military participation in the Yemen war have
had a serious impact on the economy.26 Besides, the socialist policies of the state in this period
led to the exodus of capital abroad and deprived the economy from huge sums due to
inhospitable investment climate and the political turmoil plaguing the state and damaging the
economy.27 In short, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the rate of economic growth sharply
decreased and both the rate of investment and domestic savings slowed down.28

B. Open Door Policy (1970-1990)
The Egyptian economy fell into a total disrepair at the time of Nasser’s death in September 1970.
The public sector was on the brink of collapse and needed a constant infusion of funds, and about
20 percent of the gross national income went to military expenditure because of the War of

23

- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 7.
- Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7, at 63.
25
- Delwin A. Roy and William T. Irelan, Law and Economics in the Evolution of Contemporary Egypt, 25
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 165 (1989)
26
- Id, at 165; Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7, at 63.
27
- Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7, at 65.
28
- Id, at 64; GDP growth slowed significantly to 2.9 percent per year from 1966–1971; Khalid Ikram, supra note 5,
at 12.
24
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Attrition in the Suez Canal.29 The growth of GDP was significantly reduced and the budget was
mainly financed through borrowing from the national banking system.30 Sadat believed that the
failure of the socialist economic direction which resulted in the inefficiency of the nationalized
public sector and the collapsed infra-structure after the War of 1967, necessitates important
financial flows into the Egyptian economy. In fact, Sadat had to choose either to continue with
the legacy of socialist economic ideas or to open up the country to implement new economic
visions that could help in restructuring the economy to become more liberal.

Upon taking power, Sadat started to move towards the West through opening new channels of
economic exchange. The government adopted new economic policies based on protecting private
property rights, banning nationalizations and sequestrations, encouraging foreign investment, and
reinforcing the role of the private sector.31 Accordingly, the government rendered Law No. 34 of
the year 1971 which banned sequestration of private assets except with a court’s judgment as a
message of reassurance to confirm that private property would now be protected by the state.32

Moreover, the preservation of private property was strongly affirmed in the new 1971
Constitution. The sanctity of private property was reflected directly in Article 34 of the 1971
Constitution which stated:
Private property shall be protected and may not be put under sequestration except in the
cases specified in the law and with a judicial decision. It may not be expropriated except
for a public purpose and fair compensation in accordance with the law. The right of
inheritance is guaranteed in it.33
In terms of nationalization, Article 35 of the 1971 Constitution states that “nationalization shall
not be allowed except for considerations of public interest, by means of law and with
compensation.”34 Article 36 states that “general confiscation of property shall be prohibited.
29

- Tamir Moustafa, Law versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 883, 889
(2003).
30
- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 17.
31
-Tamir Moustafa, supra note 29, at 889.
32
- Law no. 34 of June 17, 1971 on Sequestration (Tanzeem Frd el harsa and Ta’meen Salama al Shaa’b). InEgy
OG of June 17, 1971, no. 24.
33
- Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (DusturJumhuriyatMisr al-Arabiyah) [Egy const.] of September 12,
1971, sec. II, art. 34. InEgy OG of September 12, 1971, vol. 36 bis (a). , as translated in Tamir Moustafa, supra note
7.
34
- Egy 1971 Const, Supra note 33, art. 35, as translated in Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7.
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Special and limited confiscation shall not be allowed except with a judicial decision.”35 Tamir
Moustafa argues that the language used for articulating the guarantees against nationalization and
sequestration of private property was, acutely, vague since it opened the door for different
interpretations that could provide the government with the ability to unilaterally issue a
legislation that regulates the sequestration of private property according to its needs.36
Despite the fact that Sadat realized the inefficiency of Nasser’s socialist approach and started to
take wide measures to alleviate the state intervention in the economy, the 1971 Constitution was
socialist in its essence and tone. Article 4 of the 1971 Constitution stated that “]t[he economic
basis of the Arab Republic of Egypt is the socialist democratic system founded on selfsufficiencies and justice, precluding exploitation, reducing the differences between incomes, and
protecting of legitimate earnings, and ensuring equity of distribution of the charges and general
expenditures.”37

At that time, policy makers realized that a new economic agenda should aim at alleviating the
harsh consequences of Nasser’s socialist approach economically and politically.38 Thus, the
government adopted a comprehensive economic reform Open Door or Infta’h that was
considerably different from Nasser’s perspective. In 1974, the regime rendered October Paper a
document designed to demarcate the new economic perspective of the government. The October
Paper approved by the Egyptians in a national referendum on May 1974.39 This document
provided a comprehensive guide of the path of the economy in the future. Khalid Akram argues
that the main aim of this paper is to find a mechanism that encourages Arab and foreign investors
to invest in Egypt.40 For that reason, Arab and Foreign Investment and Free Zones Law No.43 of
the year 197441 was enacted to regulate the path of foreign investment in the economy. The new
law contained many economic incentives for foreign and national investors including tax

35

- Egy 1971 Const, Supra note 33, art. 36. as translated in Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7.
-Tamir Moustafa, supra note 29, at 890.
37
- Egy 1971 Const, Supra note 33, art. 4, as translated in Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7.
38
- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 17.
39
- The Decision of Minister of Interior to announce the result of the National Referendum. InEgy OG of June 16,
1974, no. 109.(bis).
40
- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 21.
41
- Law no. 43 of June 27, 1974 on Arab and Foreign Investment and Free Zones (Nazam Astsamr al Mal El Araby
w al aganby w al Mantaa’ al Hora). InEgy OG of June 27, 1974, no. 26.
36

10

exemptions, the ability to import new technology and machinery for production, partial
exemptions from currency regulations, exemptions from Egypt's stringent labor laws, and
exemptions on limits to annual salaries.42

The Open Door policy was the beginning of the transition to the market economy in a way that
reduced the intervention of the state in the economy and gave the private sector the ability to
restructure its function as a cardinal player in the economy. Lama Abu Odeh says that Sadat
based his new economic style on trade liberalization.43 However, the new economic policy led to
an increase in food imports especially wheat and luxury goods which resulted in aggravating the
deficit in the balance of payment.44 Khalid Ikram argues that although Open Door policy did give
the indication that private sector would participate actively in the economy and that the entry of
the foreign investors would be facilitated, the actual impact on the economy was inadequate.45
The main sectors of the economy like petroleum production, banking, and infrastructure were
still dominated by public enterprises. This is attributed to the fact that there were laws remained
in effect that hinder the progress of private enterprises and the deficiency of the incentive
structure.46

To sum up, it is clearly evident that the new economic vision had positive effects on stimulating
economic growth and attracting foreign investments; however, it was unsuccessful to lead the
government to achieve any fundamental change in the economy.

C. Neo-liberalism _ Privatization (1991-2011)

42

- Tamir Moustafa, supra note 29, at 889.
- Lama Abu-Odeh, supra note 11, at 69.
44
- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 22; See JOHN WATERBURY, EGYPT OF NASSER AND SADAT: THE
POLITICES OF TWO REGIMES 95-6 (Princeton University Press, ed.1), (1983).
45
-Id, at 18-22.
46
- id, Delwin A. Roy and William T. Irelan, supra note 25, at 172; there is another approach that attributes the
inability of the Open Door policy to achieve institutional change in the structure of the economy to other factors.
Galal Amin argues that Open Door Policy is characterized by inconsistency and confusion. He believes the
government remains puzzled about its economic direction. In his point of view, Amin believes that the government
adopted conflicting economic objectives that led finally to a sharp increase in budget deficit; See GALAL AMIN,
THE STORY OF THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 99-100 (Qst al Aqtsad el masry) (Arabic) (1st ed. 2012).
43
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After the assassination of Sadat by Islamists in 1981, Mubarak had continued and even
accelerated the reforms as evidenced by the consistent economic policies he had enacted
throughout his rule.

In the early nineties, the economic position of Egypt was lamentable. Indeed, the country started
to suffer dramatically from a downturn in growth rate and macroeconomic imbalances. The
economy was deeply engulfed in productive dilemmas.47 Indeed, at the end of the Gulf War,
Egypt had a budget deficit of 15% of GDP, an inflation rate of about 14.7%, a balance of
payment deficit running at a rate of LE 11.4billion, a strong decline in the value of the Egyptian
Pound and a clear delay in paying the international debts.48 Such a strained economic position
was accompanied by international criticism of the Egyptian economic circumstances and calls
for adopting different economic policies in order to address the economic situation and achieve
macroeconomic stability.49

In this context, for instance, the United States Embassy in Cairo issued a report motivating the
Egyptian authorities to abandon the notion of public property and support the public sector.50
Additionally, the report argued that concentrating and depending on the public sector system,
enlarging the role of the state in regulating and controlling the market activities, and establishing
projects characterized by inefficiency and labor redundancies, had led to depressing impacts on
the whole public economy and put heavy burdens on the government budget.51 Concurrently, the
government policy makers realized that the government had to intervene strongly and
comprehensively to cope with the strained economic position. In 1991 the executive authorities
began reacting with a cluster of initiatives and solutions to address the alarming economic
situation. Chief among them was transferring the ownership and management of the public
sectors’ companies to the private sector.52
47

- Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 60; Safwat A. Awadalla, Privatization and Economic Development: Study on the
Effect of Privatization on the Economic Efficiency in Developing Counties: Egypt - as a Case Study under Law No.
203 for 1991, 18 Arab L.Q. 40 (2003).
48
- Id, at 61.
49
- HAMDY YASSIN, STATE COUNCIL’S ROLE AND FIGHTING THE CORRUPTED PRIVATIZATION
AND PLANS FOR SALE EGYPT (Dor Majlis al Dowla fe Mohrba al Khaskhasa al Fasada w Khatt Baa’ Masr)
(Arabic) (1st ed. 2014).
50
- Id, at. 83.
51
- Id.
52
- Id.
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Consequently, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announced officially in a public speech at
the 1991 May Day ceremony that “the country will adopt privatization as an official economic
policy in order to create a more liberal economy.”53 Mubarak believed that such an economic
reform could have fruitful consequences on the Egyptian economy because privatization, firstly,
would bring efficiency and profitability to the privatized assets, secondly, would reduce
government cost and government intervention in the economy, and finally, would enhance
individual and collective investment.54

The former Prime Minister Dr. Hazem EL Beblawi argues that the adoption of the privatization
program by the Egyptian government was due to a pure political arrangement.55 According to
this political framework, Egypt was exempted from paying about USD 7 billion to Arab
countries and about USD 3 billion to the US for military debts. Moreover, the Paris Club brought
down about half of the international debts of Egypt. In return, Egypt was committed to entirely
adopt and implement an Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP)
designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.56

The ERSAP mainly concentrated on monetary reform through liberalizing the Egyptian Pound,
diminishing the budget deficit, and finally, controlling the inflation rate. On the same level, the
program also aimed at guaranteeing and achieving an entire structural adjustment in the Egyptian
economy in order to increase the economic and social development rates. This was to be done
through different legal and economic steps: firstly, adopting privatization and diminishing the
role of the public sector through liquidating all losing public sector enterprises; secondly, putting
a legal framework that would guarantee a safe climate for national and foreign investment;
thirdly, emphasizing on the role of the civil and private institutions in the economy to alleviate
the burdens on the government.57
53

- Id.
- Id.
55
- HAZEM EL BEBLAWI, THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONONMY, 128 (Dor al Dowla fe al Aqtsad)
(Arabic) (1st ed. 1999); see generally, SAMIR SULAYMAN, THE STRONG REGIME AND THE WEAK STATE
(al Nizam al Qawy w al Dowla al Daa’efa) (Arabic)(2004); Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 63.
56
-id, Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors. The function of the Paris Club is to find coordinated and
sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. As debtor countries undertake
reforms to improve and rebalance their macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Clubs’ creditors offer a flexible
agreement in order debt scheduling; available at, http://www.clubdeparis.org.
57
- id.
54
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No wonder Egypt was one of the first Arab countries to adopt a leading public sector in the
1950s and 1960s and also was the first country to adopt new liberalization economic strategies
like privatization.58 It is undeniable that the economic transformation from a planed to free
market economy was inconceivable unless a legislative and regulatory infrastructure was
established.

Concerning the legal framework for the privatization, program policy makers worked on
establishing a legislative and regulatory climate for its implementation. As a result, Law No. 203
of the year 199159 on Public Sector Business Companies was issued by People’s Assembly in
order to pave the way for the selling and transferring of the public sector organizations. This law
replaced the public sector organizations and companies with holding companies, subsidiaries,
and affiliate, based on a decision rendered by the Prime Minister.

Institutionally, the Public Sector Business Companies Law shifted the economic management of
the Egyptian public sector companies, and accordingly, these economic institutions became
independent economic enterprises and were recognized “moral personalities” managed and
regulated in a way that was comparable to the private sector companies and were subject to
private laws.60 In other words, this law revolved around the idea of entire segregation of the
management and ownership of the public business sector. Holding companies were responsible
for initiating and implementing the privatization of affiliated companies. Decisions regarding
production and marketing were to be issued by the directors and the boards of the affiliated
companies. This law created the post of Minister of Public Sector Business. 61

It should be noted that Law No.203 of the year 1991 did not contain clauses that explicitly
regulate and manage the adoption and implementation of privatization as a governmental
economic policy. It was only Article 20 that allowed the sale or the transfer of any asset,
organization or activity from the public to the private sector. According to Article 20 of the
58

- Safwat A. Awadalla, supra note 47, at 40.
- Law no. 203 of June 20, 1991 on Public Sector Business Companies (Qataa’ al Aa’aml al Aa’m). InEgy OG of
June19, 1991, no. 24(bis).
60
- Safwat A. Awadalla, supra note 47, at 34.
61
- Public Sector Business Companies Law, supra note 59, art.6; See generally Safwat A. Awadalla, supra note 47,
at 41.
59
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Public Sector Business Law, private entities and individuals may directly purchase shares in
public affiliated companies according to the general regulations of the stock market. The
proportion of private ownership in these companies was specified by the state on a case-by-case
basis.62 In case the state relinquished its majority ownership in a particular company 51% then
the company would no longer be subject to the provisions of Public Sector Business Law but to
the provisions of the Companies Law No.159 of the year 1981,63 which governs private sector
corporations. This article has led to a considerable debate among legal scholars due to its
ambiguity and it severe conflict with the constitutional economic principles of the state in this
period, but I will postpone this debate to the next chapter.64
Besides the Public Sector Business Law, Law No.95 of the year 199265on Capital Market Law
was also issued. This law regulated the stock market and provided legal stipulation for trade in
the market. This law, moreover, established the Capital Market Authority which had the
competence to guarantee the proper enforcement of the Law No.95 of the year 1992 and monitor
the performance of the brokerage firms in the stock market.

Along with this legislative environment, the Technical Office of the Enterprise Sector in the
Office of the Prime Ministry prepared a detailed economic guideline for the privatization process
in February 1993.66 This guideline was primarily drafted in order to reach certain economic
objectives. These objectives were first, enlarging the usage of available resources of public
sector; second, avoiding wasting the public resources and using them efficiently; third, opening
the market for foreign capital and stimulating investment in Egypt; fourth, creating new

62

- Public Sector Business Companies Law, supra note 59, art.20.
- Law no. 159 of Sep. 17, 1981 on Companies Law (Al Sharakat). InEgy OG of Oct. 1, 1981, no. 40.
64
- For just a few examples, see Hazem EL Beblawi, supra note 55, at 107-109; MUSTAPHA KAMEl Al SAYYID.
RULE OF LAW, ISLAM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICIS IN EGYPT AND IRAN 225-228, (Arjomand,
Said Amir, Brown, Nathan J. ed., State University of New York Press, ed.1) (2013).
65
- Law no. 95 of June 25, 1992 on Capital Market Law (Soa’ al Mal). InEgy OG of June26, 1992, no. 25(bis); the
Capital Market Authority had been replaced by The Financial Regulatory Authority by Law no. 10/2009, The
function of the Authority focuses on controlling and regulating non-banking financial markets and instruments,
including the Capital Market, the Exchange, all activities related to Insurance Services, Mortgage Finance, Financial
Leasing, Factoring and Securitization. The role of this institution is also to organize the market, ensure its stability
and competitiveness to attract more local and foreign investment, and to protect the national and foreign investors
and participants rights, available at http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/main_efsa_page_en.htm
66
- HamdyYassin, supra note 49, at. 84.
63
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employment opportunities and, simultaneously adopting programs for improving the technical
quality of the Egyptian labor, and ultimately, incentivizing the investment in the market.67

Additionally, in order to tackle any issue that may hinder the smooth implementation of the
Egyptian privatization program, the Prime Minister had formed the Higher Ministerial
Committee for Privatization by decision No.1765 of the year 2000.68 This Committee was
composed of 22 ministers and headed by the Prime Minister. Its main objective was firstly,
selecting the companies which would be privatized and the ones that would stay under the state
ownership, secondly, setting a comprehensive plan accompanied with a timeline for the
privatization program according to the reports and data submitted by competent authorities,
thirdly, identifying the criteria and regulations upon which the privatization was implemented,
fourthly, recommending where the privatizations’ proceeds would be spent, fifthly, approving
the recommendations of the concerned ministers in terms of the timeline of the privatization
program, ultimately, unifying the different perspectives of ministries concerning the major
dilemmas of the privatization and achieving coordination among the governmental institutions to
find solutions for the critical issues.

In fact, the Privatization policy was designed to be fully implemented within five years. The
government offered, annually, not less than 25 public sector enterprises for privatization whether
through floating on the stock market or direct negotiations with investors. This number could be
raised according to the absorptive capacity of the market for the privatization
transactions.69According to the proposed plan, the proceeds from selling public assets should be
directed to pay the debts of these assets, reinforce the resources of the state budget, and finally,
pay cash compensations to those who decided to retire optionally for tackling the issue of labor
redundancy.70

67

- Id, p. 84, 85; However these guidelines have been updated several times until October 1996, the economic
direction of the guidelines did not change; See generally, ZAINAB ABDEL AZEEM, IMF AND THE ECONOMIC
REFORM IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Sando’ al Naqd al Dowly w al Aslah al Aqtsady) ( Arabic) (1sted,
1999).
68
-Prime Minister Decree No. 1765 of August 30, 2000 on Formation the Higher Ministerial Committee for
Privatization. (Tashkeel Al Lagna Al Wazerya lel Khaskhasa)In Egy.OG of August 30, 2000, no. 197.
69
-HamdyYassin, supra note 49 at. 85.
70
-Id; see generally, Zainab, Abdel Azeem, supra note 67.
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The government policy initially drafted to privatize about 316 public sector enterprises with
assets of about of L.E 68 billion and revenues estimated to be over L.E 60 billion, while
85companies were excluded from the first phase.71 The privatization plan also excluded public
enterprises which related to national security concerns like the Suez Canal, Egypt Air, and
petroleum companies.72 The program started slowly in 1993, but then accelerated until 1999. By
2003, the Egyptian government had entirely privatized about 133 public sector companies, and
35 companies had been partially privatized.73

To Sum up, Since the Revolution of 1952 Egypt has witnessed several approaches to market
governance and to the economic and social development of the country. The identification of the
dynamics of economic policies in Egypt during each economic epoch in terms of motives,
regulatory framework, and the actual application of each policy will help in understanding of the
role of the judicial institutions

71

- See generally Khalid Ikram, supra note 5, at 80; Safwat A. Awadalla, supra note 47, at 42-43.
- Id.
73
- Hamdy Yassin, supra note 49, at 78.
72
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III.

Judicial Review of Economic Policies

Any litigation against the government gives the judiciary the opportunity to play a role in
shaping public policy, including economic policies. However, the efficacy of this role was not
static. Sometimes, the executive branch used the Courts to legitimate potentially unpopular
policies. In others, the executive branch intervened to limit their reach, thereby reducing their
power to meaningfully affect economic policies.

A. Nature and Progress of Judicial Review in Egypt.
Initially, it should be noted that the Egyptian judicial system is based on what is known as the
dualistic legal system. It composed of two branches, one dealing with civil and criminal law and
the other deals with administrative law. In other words, Civil courts (Al Qada’ Al A’adi) or
Ordinary Judiciary settle disputes between citizens in terms of tort, civil contract, commercial
transactions, and family issues. The Court of Cassation (Mahkamat al-Naqd) prevailing over
civil courts, with courts of first instance (al-Mahakim al-Ibtida’iyya) and appellate courts
(Mahakim al-Isti’naf) distributed across the country. While, the administrative courts, within the
Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla), settle disputes in which citizens challenge administrative
actions; or, decisions of the government or any agency within the state bureaucracy. The
Supreme Administrative Court sits at the apex of the administrative judiciary in Egypt.74 The
Council of State operates as a critical judicial avenue for citizens and civil servants to seek
remedies for administrative abuse of power.75

In fact, before the establishment of the Supreme Court in 1969, the Council of State was the only
public law judge with general jurisdiction over administrative disputes.76 According to Law No.
74

- Adel Omar Sherif, An Overview of the Egyptian Judicial System, and Its History, 5 Y.B. Islamic & Middle E. L.
3 (1998-1999).
75
- Article 190 of the 2014 Constitution states that “The Council of State is an independent judicial body which is
solely competent to adjudicate administrative disputes, disciplinary cases and appeals, and execution disputes
pertaining to its decisions. It is also solely competent to issue opinions in the legal issues of bodies to be determined
by law, review and draft bills and resolutions of a legislative character, and review draft contracts to which the state
or any public entity is a party. Other competencies are to be determined by law.” Constitution of the Arab Republic
of Egypt (DusturJumhuriyat Misr al-Arabiyah) [Egy const.] of January 18, 2014, sec. III, art. 190. InEgy OG of
January 18, 2014, vol. 3 bis, (free Translation by the Author). This Article is amended by 2019 Referendum; InEgy
OG of April 17, 2019, vol. 15 bis(3).
76
- Law no. 81 of Aug. 31, 1969 on Law of Supreme Court (Al-Mahkama Al- Ulya). InEgy OG of Aug. 31, 1969,
no.35(bis); Article 4 of Law No.81 of the 1969 determined the powers of the Supreme Court. According to this
article, the Court was competent to constitutionally review laws, interpret legislative texts, and settle conflicts on
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48 of the year 1979, the Supreme Constitutional Court replaced the Supreme Court.77 Upon its
establishment in 1979, the Supreme Constitutional Court sits at the top of the Egyptian judicial
system. The Supreme Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction to constitutionally review
legislations and regulations, render final interpretation of legislative texts, and finally adjudicate
disputes that may arise in terms of the enforcement of two contradictory final judgments
rendered on the same subject matter by two different judicial bodies.78

Patterned to the French template, the Council of State is the highest administrative judicial
avenue in Egypt. Since its inception, the Council of State is regarded as the sole arbiter with
respect to governmental conducts which are rendered by executive authority acting in their
capacity as a public authority.79 Historically, the Council of State Majlis al Dawla was
established in 1946 to handle certain kinds of administrative disputes.80 According to Law No,
112 of the year 1946, the Council of State was confined to certain sorts of administrative
disputes such as elections of local administrative agencies, administrative contracts and disputes
involving government employees in terms of appointments, promotions disciplinary decisions,
retirement, salaries, pensions and compensation.81
Compared to Law No.165 of the year 195582 striping the Council of State from its powers and
giving the Prime Minister powers and jurisdictions of the general assembly of the Council of
State and the Special Council al Majlis al Khas, President Sadat initiated a new approach with
the Council of State through restoring its effective judicial jurisdictions over governmental

competence by specifying the competent body among different judicial bodies. The Supreme Court was dissolved
by Law No.48 of the year 1979 on the Establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court.
77
- Law no. 48 of Sept. 20, 1979 on Law of Supreme Constitutional Court (Al-Mahkama Al- Dustrya Al- Ulya).
InEgy OG of Sep. 6, 1979, no. 36, art. 9.
78
- id, Supreme Constitutional Court Law, art. 25, art. 26.
79
- Adel Omar Sherif, supra note 74, at 22.
80
- Law no. 112 of Aug. 15, 1946 on Law of the Establishment of Council of State (insha Majlis al Dawla’). InEgy
OG of Aug. 15, 1946, no. 83.
81
- id, Establishment of the Council of State Law, art. 4; See Adel Omar Sherif, supra note 73, at 23.
82
- Law no. 165 of Mar 29, 1955 on Law of Council of State (Tanzeem Majlis al Dowla). InEgy OG of Mar 29,
1955, art. 1, art. 5, art. 6, art. 61 no. 25(bis); this law was amended by Law No.55 of the Year 1959 after the unity
with Syria; the Special Council is the high authority in Council of State which is responsible for regulating the
occupational life for judges in terms of appointments, promotions, and retirements. This council is headed by the
president of the Council of State and the senior six vice-president.
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activities and protecting and enhancing the social and personal rights of the citizens.83 This was
confirmed by the 1971 Constitution, which was the first constitutional document that explicitly
stipulated the jurisdictions of the Council of State.
Article No. 172 of the 1971 Constitution stated that “The Council of State shall be an
independent judiciary organization competent to take decisions in administrative disputes and
disciplinary cases, the law shall determine its other competences.”84 Moreover, Article No. 68 of
the 1971 Constitution reinforced the Council of State’s role by prohibiting the immunity of any
act or administrative decision from the control of the judiciary.85 Consequently, Law No.47 of
the year 197286 on the Council of State determined the powers of the administrative judicial
system and enhanced its independence and capacity.

According to Law No. 47 of 1972, the Council consists of three principle sections: the judiciary
section, the opinion section and the legislative section. The Judiciary section has an exclusive
jurisdiction to review and monitor administrative acts, including government contracts,
disciplinary cases, public property determinations, public order and safety disputes, disputes
relating to wages, pensions due to public servants or their successors, and compensation claims
arising from these disputes.87

Judicially, the administrative court has the power to annul administrative decision and
compensate the aggrieved party if it finds on one of four specific statutory grounds: (1) the
issuing entity is not authorized to issue the decision, (2) defective form, (3) violation of laws, or

83

- Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7, at 82; Moustafa argues that Sadat and Mubarak worked on the reemergence of the
Council of State in 1970s and 1980s in order to cope the administrative bureaucracy, he added that the Council of
State helped the regime to identify the most important cases of administrative dysfunction through a coherent system
of procedural rules, standing criteria.
84
- Egy 1971 Const, Supra note 33, art. 172; as translated in Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7.
85
- Id, art. 68; as translated in Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7.
86

- Law no. 47 of Oct. 10, 1972 on Council of State (Majlis al Dawla). InEgy OG of Oct. 5, 1972, art, 1, no.40; this
law abolished Law No.55 of the year 1959; this law is amended by Law No.136 of the year 1984.
87
-id, Article 10 of the Council of State Law states that the State Council is competent for settling disputes which
result from 1) appeals relating to the local authorities' elections; 2) Disputes relating to wages, pensions,
compensations due to public servants or their successors; 3) Requests made by the parties concerned to appeal the
final administrative decisions concerning appointment in public positions, promotion or granting allowances; 4)
…….; 5) ………; 11) contracts that relate to administering public utilities and providing the government with
commodities and any other administrative contract.”
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(4) abuse of power.88 Specifically, an administrative decree that was taken by the proper official,
according to prescribed procedures, and in conformity with laws and regulations was assured of
judiciary.

However the review of the Council of State extends to oversight all administrative decisions and
acts, some governmental actions lay beyond the purview of the administrative judiciary. Acts of
sovereignty is a clear example.89 In Egypt, theory of acts of sovereignty was established on a
legislative basis, that there are explicit provisions in legislations that emphasize immunity of
sovereign acts. Nevertheless the legislator’s approach in dealing with acts of sovereignty was not
static. For example, the Law No.112 of the year 1946 determined some sorts of acts of
sovereignty such as those acts pertaining internal and external security, acts relating to
international relations, and acts regulating the relation between the executive power and the
Parliament.90 While the legislator did not precisely determine these acts in subsequent
legislations; this task was left to the judiciary itself.91
In this regards, the Jurist Sulaiman Al Tammawi defined acts of sovereignty as “ the acts
performed by the executive power and shaped with special considerations like internal and
external safety of the state and is not subject to the court control if judicial power so decides.”92
Moreover, According to the Supreme Administrative Court, acts of sovereignty means “the
actions performed by the government as a governing authority rather than an administration
authority.”93 Having reviewed the Council of State’ Rulings, it is found that it did not depend on
a specific criterion to define acts of sovereignty. Rather, it adopted various criteria in different
cases such as the political motive criterion, nature of work criterion.94

88

- Id, see generally, HAMDY YASSIN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS OF STATE
COUNCIL JUDICIARY(Mowsoaa’ al Qararat al Adary fi Qada’ Majlis al Dowla) (Part 1) (Arabic) ( 2010).
89
- Theory of Sovereign Acts was emerged by the French justice. It was created by the French Council of State.
90
- Establishment of the Council of State Law, Supra note 80, art. 6.
91
- Council of State Law (Majlis al Dawla) Supra note 86, art. 11 Council of State law provides that the Council
do not have jurisdiction over the requests in connection with acts of sovereignty ; See also, Law no. 46 of Oct. 10,
1972 on Judicial Authority (al Solta al Qadaaya). InEgy OG of Oct. 5, 1972, art, 17.
92
- see generally, SULAIMAN ALTAMMAWI, AMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY, ANNULMENT JUSTICE , 421
(Part1) (Arabic) (1967).
93
- Case No. 26299, Judicial Year no. 51, of June 23, 2013, Supreme Administrative Court, (Egypt) (Majmūʻat almabādiʼ al-qānūnīyah allatī qarraratʹhā al-Maḥkamah al-Idārīyah al-ʻUlyā fī khams sanawāt)(The set of principles
adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court. The Eleventh Panel)[Egyptian Judicial review], at 924.
94
- HAMDY YASSIN, Supra note 88, at 161-65.
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Since the theory of acts of sovereignty is directly contrary to the principle of legality, which
requires that all administrative conducts are subject to law, the Council of State goes to diminish
the conducts that lay within the acts of sovereignty by removing some acts from the scope of acts
of sovereignty and start to review these acts as administrative decisions. For example, the
Supreme Administrative Court considered the signature of the representative of the Egyptian
government on international conventions is an administrative decision and lay within the
purview of the Council of State.95
For instance the Supreme Administrative stated the president’s declaration to invite citizens for
Parliament election is an administrative one according to the 2013 Constitutional Declaration.96
Moreover, the Administrative Judiciary Court ruled that “… the power of the President of the
Republic to declare the state of emergency has ceased to be an absolute power; rather it is a
restricted power”. The court declared that the decision of the state of emergency is an
administrative one and is not regarded as acts of sovereignty according to the 2013
Constitutional Declaration. 97

Additionally, the role of the opinion section is to provide administrative agencies with legal
advice and revise administrative contracts, wherein the legislative section is responsible for
reviewing the drafts of laws and public regulations before issuance. These jurisdictions helped
95

- Case No.74236, Judicial Year no. 62, of January 16, 2017, Supreme Administrative Court, (Egypt) (print copy);
in contrast, the Supreme Constitutional Court relied on the nature of work criterion to differentiate between acts of
sovereignty and other administrative acts. The Court concluded that the signature of the representative of the
Egyptian Government on the international convention is pure political conduct. See Case No. 12, Judicial Year no.
39, of March 3, 2018, Supreme Constitutional Court. InEgy OG of March 7, 2018, no.9(bis)(c), at 21
96
- Case No.13846, Judicial Year no. 59, of April 21, 2013, Supreme Administrative Court, (Egypt) (Majmūʻat almabādiʼ al-qānūnīyah allatī qarraratʹhā al-Maḥkamah al-Idārīyah al-ʻUlyā fī khams sanawāt)(The set of principles
adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court. The Eleventh Panel)[Egyptian Judicial review]; In fact there were
some judgment considered the President declaration to invite citizens for election is an act of sovereignty according
to the 1971 Constitution; see Case No.9376, Judicial Year no. 53, of March 25, 2007, Supreme Administrative
Court, (Egypt) (Majmūʻat al-mabādiʼ al-qānūnīyah allatī qarraratʹhā al-Maḥkamah al-Idārīyah al-ʻUlyā fī khams
sanawāt)(The set of principles adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court) [Egyptian Judicial review] at 555.
97
- Case No.74029, Judicial Year no. 67, of November 12, 2013, Administrative Judiciary Court, (Egypt) (printed
copy); the Court stated that “the constitutional progress in the 2014 Constitution, by putting restricts on the power of
the President concerning the state of emergency, requires the awareness of the judiciary to understand the obvious
intention of the constitutional legislator to reduce the administrative abuse of power” (free translation by the author);
in past, the Council of State considered this act as an act of sovereignty, which lay beyond the review of the
judiciary; see Case No.39323, Judicial Year no. 60, of March 27, 2007, Administrative Judiciary Court, (Egypt),
(printed copy).
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the Council of State expand the judicial oversight in defending civil and political rights against
any illegal or arbitrary administrative conducts.98

As I mentioned above, before the establishment of the constitutional review in Egypt, each court
had the power to interpret legislative texts and abstain from enforcing laws which were deemed
to violate the constitution the supreme law and ultimate source of all powers. Nevertheless,
during that era neither ordinary judiciary nor the Council of State had the authority to strike
down the unconstitutional clauses, but only refrain from applying it on the subject matter.99

In 1969, Law No.81 was rendered to establish the Supreme Court. This court had an exclusive
power for judicial review and interpretation of legislative texts. The establishment of this court is
considered as the beginning of the constitutional review in Egypt. The Supreme Court replaced
the notion of abstention control exercised by the Council of State courts in 1948. Tamer
Moustafa argues that the establishment of the Supreme Court was an attempt by the government
to hinder judicial institutions from practicing abstention control, which had led to negative
outcomes in the side of the government. Moustafa adds that the explanatory memorandum to
Law No. 81 of the year 1969 disclosed the real desire of the government behind the
establishment of the new Supreme Court when stating that “it has become clear in many cases
that the judgments of the judiciary are not able to join the march of development which has
occurred in social and economic relations.”100

In 1979, upon the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court ceased
to exist and the new Court retained the power of judicial review. The Supreme Constitutional
Court has been delegated to exercise this power by the explicit provisions of the 1971
Constitution. Consequently, all other courts have been precluded from exercising this power with
the new court.101
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- Adel Omar Sherif, supra note 74, at 22.
- Id, at 18; Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7, at 66.
100
- The Text of Explanatory Memorandum as cited in Tamir Moustafa, supra note 7 at. 66.
101
- Adel Omar Sherif, supra note 74, at 18.
99
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In fact, although the 1971 Constitution affirmed the establishment of a Supreme Constitutional
Court to review the constitutionality of laws and regulations and issue binding interpretations of
legislative clauses, the court had still not been operated since the enabling legislation had not
been rendered until 1979. Article 174 of the 1971 Constitution stated that “The Supreme
Constitutional Court shall be an independent judicial body, having its own juristic personality in
the Arab Republic of Egypt, and having its seat in Cairo.”102 Moreover, Article 175 of the 1971
Constitution stated that:
The Supreme Constitutional Court alone shall undertake the judicial control in respect of
the constitutionality of the laws and regulations and shall undertake the interpretation of
the legislative texts in the manner prescribed by law. The law shall prescribe the other
competences of the court, and regulate the procedures to be followed before it.103
The Supreme Constitutional Court is seen as one of the most important judicial and academic
platforms in Egypt. The Court has played a pivotal role in reviewing public economic policies
and political rights since its creation until now. Institutionally, the Court enjoyed substantial
independence from governmental intervention compared to the Supreme Court.104 The Law
No.48 of the year 1979 gives judges the capacity to perform their legal duties without worry of
removal or reprisals by executive authority. The General Assembly of the Court only has the
power to manage the internal affairs of the court and to discipline its judges.105

Judicially, Law No.48 of the year 1979 demarcates the powers and jurisdictions of the Supreme
Constitutional Court. In this connection, Article 25 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Law
states that:
The following fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court:
(Firstly) the exercise of the power of judicial review in constitutional issues with respect
to laws and regulations. (Secondly) the settlement of conflicts on competence by
specifying the competent body among different judicial bodies or other judicial forums,
whenever a case dealing with the same subject-matter is being brought before two of such
branches or forums, and jurisdiction regarding that case was not disclaimed by one of

102

- Egy 1971 Const, Supra note, art.174; as translated in Tamir Moutafa, supra note 7.
- Id, art.175; as trasnlated in Tamir Moutafa, supra note 7.
104
- Tamir, Moustafa. supra note 29, at 893.
105
- Supreme Constitutional Court Law, Supra note 77, art.8, art. 11; see generally Tamir Moustafa, supra note 27, at
895.
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25

them or was disclaimed by both. (Thirdly) the determination of a final judgment in cases
where two or more other judicial bodies have produced contradictory judgments.106
Practically, the Supreme Constitutional Court is entitled to perform judicial review only when it
receives cases transferred from courts of merit. According to Article 29 of the Law No.48 of the
year 1979, if any court, in the course of deciding a concrete case, finds that a law being applied
may be unconstitutional, it can suspend the proceedings and transfer the case to the Supreme
Constitutional Court for review. In most cases, a petition for judicial review in front of the SCC
is requested by litigants themselves. Judges also have the power to cease the proceedings and file
a request to the Supreme Constitutional Court if they find the constitutionality of a particular law
they are applying questionable.107

In short, the concept of judicial review in Egypt currently has two machineries: review of
constitutionality and review of legality. Constitutional review aims at guaranteeing the
conformity of laws and regulations with the Constitution. Legality review seeks to maintain the
adherence of administrative decisions and contracts to the applicable laws and public regulations.
In other words, the authority of judicial review is divided between the Supreme Constitutional
Court for constitutional matters on one hand, and the Council of State for administrative
controversies on the other hand. 108

In this context, the Supreme Constitutional Court and Council of State stood at the center of the
most controversial debates concerning the review of the economic policies and economic identity
of the Egyptian state. The judicial review of public economic policies has been changing since
1952, the year of the proclamation of the Egyptian Republic until now. This will be discussed
later in next sections.

B. Non Intervention
The identification of the role of the public law judge in public economic policy is not a simple
matter. The role of the public law judge in reviewing the public economic policies and their
impacts during these eras has not been a constant one. The impact of this role has been always
106
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pending on the government‘s willingness, whether to execute courts’ judgments or not according
to its assessment for the economic sitution.

After its outbreak, the Free Officers' Revolution legitimacy required reinforcement by law in
order to fully back the smooth transition from monarchy to republic. The Revolutionary
Command Council assigned Abdel Raziq al-Sanhuri _the president of Council of State_ to be the
prime minister in this period. However al- Sanhuri was one of the supporters of the legitimacy of
the 1952 Revolution, He was physically beaten by regime thugs and forced to resign in 1954.109
Consequently, Law No. 165 of the year 1955 was issued to regulate the Council of State’s affairs
in terms of appointment, promotion and retirement of judicial members. The new law attached
the Council of State to the executive authority. According to this law, the Prime Minister took
over all delegated powers and jurisdictions of the general assembly of the Council of State and
the Special Council (al Majlis al khas) within 15 days and was to issue the required decisions for
applying this law.110 Consequently, the Prime Minister used the new law to issue a decree that
forced another twenty notable judges of the State Council to retire or transferred them to nonjudicial occupations.111

Although there was radical change in public economic policies from capitalism to a more statecontrolled economy reflected purely in a nationalization process and Agrarian Reform Law, the
role of the Council of State in reviewing the economic strategies of the government in this period
was significantly scarce. This can be attributed to the fact that these policies were immunized by
legislations that primarily deprived that Council of State from adjudicating disputes arising from
its implementation.

For instance, according to Agrarian Reform Law as amended by Law No. 381 of the year 1956,
the Council of State had no judicial competence to adjudicate the disputes arising from the
application of the law. This law established Judicial Committees which were entitled to settle
any conflicts regarding the application of the law and then refer the whole matter for ratification
109
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to the Supreme Committee of Agriculture Reform. The role of Judicial Committees mainly
focused on matters relating to specifying the seized land, scrutinizing its ownership and settling
distribution matters between its users. The decisions of the Supreme Committee of Agriculture
Reform were unchallengeable.112 According to Agrarian Reform Law as amended by Law
No.147 of the year 1957, the decisions of the Supreme Committee of Agriculture Reform
concerning the wastelands cannot be annulled before the Council of State courts.113

Concerning nationalization, the legal precedents of administrative courts were mainly directed to
consider the nationalization process as an act which lays beyond the Council of State
competence. Despite the fact that the notion of nationalization might impinge on the right of
property, most judgments rendered in nationalization litigations stated that the nationalization
process per se was legislative act that cannot be considered as an administrative decisions and
the Council of State is not competent to review and scrutinize these actions.114 For instance, in
case No. 452 of judicial year 11, the Supreme Administrative Court refused the case of the
plaintiff company which challenged the nationalization decree, because the nationalization
process for the concerned company was made according to Law No. 151 of the year 1963. The
Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Administrative Judiciary Court which
stated that the Council of State courts are not competent to review and scrutinize the legitimacy
of the nationalization process per se because it was a legislative act, and it was not within the
purview of Council of State Courts.115 Additionally, nationalization laws immunized the
decisions of the valuation committees regarding compensations from any sort of challenge.116
- Law no. 381 of Nov. 3, 1956 on Amending Agrarian Reform Law (Taa’deel Baad Ahkam Qanon Al-Aslaah Alzaraa’y). InEgy OG of Nov. 3, 1953, no. 88(bis) C; In fact, this law was amended by Law no.69/1971 which
allowed challenging of the decisions of the Judicial Committees only in terms of scrutiny the ownership of the
seized lands before the Supreme Administrative Court. In 2002, the Constitutional Supreme Court ruled that the
amendment of art.13(bis) by Law no.69/1971 was unconstitutional. The Supreme Constitutional Court states that the
amendment had limited the scope of challenge before Administrative Supreme Court only for disputes regarding the
scrutiny of the ownership of the seized land nevertheless the decisions of Judicial Committees in other sorts of
disputes like distribution conflicts between users which are unchallengeable once it were ratified by the Supreme
Committee of Agriculture Reform and cannot be appealed before the Administrative Supreme Court. The court
stated that the legislature, by this amendment, had led to a clear discrimination between litigants _ who had the same
legal status _ in the same nature of disputes; see generally Case No. 2, Judicial Year no. 22, of April 14, 2002,
Supreme Constitutional Court. InEgy OG of April 27, 2002, no. 17(bis), at 51.
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Ultimately, In fact, the notion of striping the Council of State from its powers was confirmed by
the 1956 Constitution. According to Article 191 of the 1956 Constitution, all decisions issued by
the Revolutionary Command Council are unchallengeable and cannot be annulled before any
judicial institution.117

In short, it is clearly evident that the Council of State did not play a significant role in economic
policies at Nasser’s era, because the government unilaterally articulated and implemented its
socialist economic policies away from any sort of judicial review. In this regard, since investors
assess the opportunities to invest their funds according to the effectiveness of the judiciary, and
the degree of protection of property rights, in this context, the absence of the judicial protection
in this period led to the exodus of capital abroad and deprived the economy from huge sums. In
other words, if the government reinforced judicial institutions with power to review
governmental and legislative conducts, the property right would be more secured and investors
would not be forced to divest their assets and move abroad and would invest their funds securely
inside Egypt.118

Consequently, these factors led the regime to think in how to restore the confidence in the
Egyptian economy. Therefore, as I mentioned in the previous section, in 1969, Law No.81 was
promulgated to set up the Supreme Court and was replaced by the Supreme Constitutional Court
in 1979. The Supreme Constitutional Court played an important role in public economic policy,
but, practically, the influence of this role was always subject to government’s discretion and this
will be reviewed in the next section.

C. Constitutional Review and the Role of the SCC.

adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court. The First Panel)[Egyptian Judicial review], (part2) at 1010; see also
Case No. 1029, Judicial Year no. 11, of Nov. 30, 1968, Supreme Administrative Court, (Egypt) (Majmūʻat almabādiʼ al-qānūnīyah allatī qarraratʹhā al-Maḥkamah al-Idārīyah al-ʻUlyā fī khams sanawāt) (The set of principles
adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court. The First Panel) [Egyptian Judicial review] (part1) at 115.
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The creation of a Supreme Court to review the validity of legislation in order to ascertain their
compliance with the constitutional provisions is considerably considered as the introduction of
an arbiter between the government and individuals.119 The literature of the Supreme Court on
reviewing public economic policies was mainly focused on Nasser’s socialist policies. In fact,
the Supreme Court maintained the identity of the socialist policies adopted at Nasser’s
presidency, which restricted the courts of the Council of State from imposing its jurisdiction to
review governmental economic policies. For instance, in case No.9 of judicial year 7, the
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the creation of Judicial Committees established
to settle disputes arising from the application of Agrarian Reform Law and considered its decrees
as judicial rulings and not as administrative decrees.120

Moreover, the Supreme Court has affirmed that the determination of the maximum agriculture
ownership for the person and his family is not contradictory to the constitution. The Court states
that such determination was a part of the states policies to abolish feudalism as one of the main
objectives of the 1952 Revolution.121 It clear evident that the judgments of the Supreme Court
revealed to what extent the court preserved the legacy of Nasser state-controlled policies and its
legal infrastructure regardless of its conflict with the protection of property rights and its
negative impacts on the climate of the investment in Egypt.
Nasser’s death at 1970 brought about changes in the economic agenda and judicial institutions.122
The economic situation was worrisome and in need of panacea. President Sadat realized the
inefficiencies of Nasser’s socialist plan and started to gradually abandon these policies that
resulted in a fragile public sector and the need to a constant infusion of funds. The government
was directed to a more capitalistic economic regime characterized by the maintaining of private
property rights and encouraging foreign investments.
119
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Without a doubt the creation of the Supreme Constitutional Court was a crucial stone of
economic reform during Sadat’s presidency. With insecure property rights, foreign investors
were reluctant about the climate of investment in Egypt due to the absence of efficient legal
institutions that guarantee their funds would not be sequestered or expropriated by the regime at
political turmoil.123 Sadat attempted to attract foreign investment and Egyptian private
investment. According to Mahmoud Fahmy one of the drafters of the Supreme Constitutional
Court Law, the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court was an outcome of the
internal and external pressure in order to reassure foreign investors that their properties would be
secured.124

Undoubtedly, the Supreme Constitutional Court rulings in economic sphere were of great
concern at the early 1980s. The Supreme Constitutional Supreme Court had substantially
involved in economic public policy. The court overturned many socialist economic policies
implemented at Nasser’s era. For example, the court declared the unconstitutionality of
sequestration process that was operated at Nasser’s era according to Law No.150 of the year
1964 and its amendment in terms of the amount of compensation paid in return since this law
was strongly contradicting with the legal basis of the protection of private property.125

Concerning nationalization, the Supreme Constitutional Court judicially reviewed Law No.117
of the year 1961 and Law No. 72 of the year 1963 concerning the nationalization of industry. As
I mentioned before, these laws immunized the decisions of the valuation committees in terms of
compensations that could be paid to the owners of the nationalized companies in a way that
deprived citizens of the right to challenge the value of compensation. The Supreme
Constitutional Court declared that these clauses are unconstitutional since they violated Article
No. 68 of the 1971 Constitution, which guaranteed judicial supervision of any administrative
decrees and supported the right to sue.126
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Moreover, the Supreme Constitutional Court, in case no. 139 of judicial year 5, ruled that Law
No. 141 of the year 1981 that determined certain methods for calculating compensation in return
for sequestration was unconstitutional. The court stated that such valuations were undervalued
and did not sufficiently account for the rate of inflation, therefore contradicting to property rights
as protected in Articles 34 and 35 of the Constitution.127

Undoubtedly, the literature of the Supreme Constitutional Court in terms of Agrarian Reform
Law was extremely substantial. Court’ rulings disclosed the deficiencies of this law and its
amendments. For instance, in case No. 3 of Judicial Year 1, the court struck down Law No. 104
of the year 1964 which provided that land that exceeded the maximum limits of the ownership
can be confiscated by the government without any sort of compensation. The court declared that
this law was in conflict with the rational basis of safeguarding of private property since it
constituted a form of confiscation and, therefore is unconstitutional.128

Moreover, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that Article 2 of Law No.148 of the year 1957
was unconstitutional because this law immunized the decrees of the Supreme Committee of the
Agrarian Reform concerning wasteland from challenge before the Council of State Courts. The
court declared the decisions of this committee were administrative in nature, and therefore Art.2
of this law contradicted with Article 68 of the 1971 Constitution.129

The role of the Supreme Constitutional Court in economic sphere was very noteworthy. Since its
creation, the Courts rulings disclosed the deficiencies of the economic policies of Nasser’s
socialist regime like nationalization, sequestration, and agrarian reform. It is clearly evident that
the court abolished some of Nasser’s socialist policies due to its infringements to the right to sue
concerning economic issues and the safeguarding of private property.

under sequestration. The SCC ruled that there must be judicial review of these administrative actions. Case no. 18,
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It is undeniable that the Supreme Constitutional Court was an effective partner in framing the
public economic policy in this era. Although the Supreme Constitutional Court went far beyond
the expected compensation that the government was intended to pay, the government benefited
from the supreme Constitutional court rulings because these judgments were extremely
consistent with its policies that were directed to protect private property rights and attract foreign
investments.

It clear obvious that the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court helped the
government in achieving desire to reduce the apparent risks regarding private investment in
Egypt as the court restored the limits of protection of the private property right. Tamir Moustafa
says “The impressive activism of the new Supreme Constitutional Court helped the regime
assure both Egyptian and foreign private investors that property rights were now secure in Egypt
and that formal institutional protections existed above and beyond mere promises by the
regime.”130
As I mentioned in the previous chapter that Mubarak’s regime signed an economic reform and
structural adjustment with international financial institutions in the early 1990s. The
implementation of privatization is regarded as the most challenging step among others in terms
of the enforcement of the economic reform, taking into consideration the sensitivity
accompanied with fear of public opinion from the notion of selling public sector enterprises.131
In fact, the socio-economic mainstream of the country in this period was not yet able to accept
the idea of privatization of the public sector enterprises due to the fact that the dominant trend
was always deemed the public sector as the cornerstone of the Egyptian economy and the driving
force for improvement and economic development.132

The dilemma of privatization in Egypt relates to the fact that the implementation of privatization
contradicted the socialist principles encapsulated by the entire Constitution of 1971. Although
privatization was at the heart of the government’s economic reform, the privatization of public
130

- Tamir Moustafa, supra note 29, at 895.
- RAMZY ZAKI, CONFUSED PROBLEMS (Qadya Mozaa’ga) ( Arabic) (1sted, 1994).
132
- Id; Dr Ramzy Zaki advised the government to hold a public referendum about the adoption of the privatization
system, because he believed that public sector is not owned by the government only but it belongs to all the
Egyptian citizens.
131

33

assets was implemented in the absence of a constitutional license explicitly allowing its existence
in the Egyptian economic sphere.

In fact, the regime was obscure in shifting to a neo- liberal economic ideology. While the 1971
Constitution was amended at the onset of the 1980s to embody clauses concerning the
presidential terms, the constitution still preserved the socialist nature of the economic regime;
this is in spite the fact that President Sadat had initiated his Open Door Infta’h in 1974 based on
free market system.133 The government did not amend the constitution and rendered Law No 203
of the year 1991 on privatization without making any constitutional reform that could pave the
way for its implementation and left the task of conferring legitimacy on privatization to the
Supreme Constitutional Court.

In fact, the socialist nature of the 1971 Constitution is reflected in many features. Firstly, the
1971 Constitution relied on the notion of development plans which are considered to be one of
the cornerstones of the socialist system. Article No. 23 highlights its socialist nature that:
The national economy shall be organized in accordance with a comprehensive
development plan which ensures the growth of the national income, fair distribution,
higher living standards, elimination of unemployment, the increase of job opportunities,
the linking of wages to productivity and the determination of minimum and maximum
wages in a manner which guarantees the reduction of disparities between incomes.134
Moreover Article 30 stated that “Public ownership is the ownership of the people and it is
confirmed by the continuous support of the public sector. The public sector shall be the vanguard
of progress in all spheres and shall assume the main responsibility in the development plan.”135
Additionally, Article No. 24 stated that “The people shall control all means of production and
direct their surplus in accordance with development plan laid down by the State.”136 The socialist
nature was also reinforced through confirming the immunity of public ownership in Article
No.33 which stated that “Public ownership shall have its sanctity. Its protection and support shall
be the duty of every citizen in accordance with the law as it is considered the mainstay of the
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strength of the homeland, a basis for the socialist system and a source of prosperity for the
people.”137 Finally, Article No. 59 stated that “safeguarding, consolidating and preserving the
socialist gains shall be a national duty”138

Based on these arguments, the privatization program was strongly resisted by leftists and
oppositions parties because such program was seen as a violation of the spirit and the letter of the
1971 Constitution.139 In this context, a lawsuit was filed by Hamdy Badr, a worker in a public
sector company, before the Supreme Constitutional Court in 1994 challenging the
constitutionality of Law No.203 of the year 1991. He complained that the company in which he
had been working was merged into another public sector company that was later sold. The
plaintiff stated that “The sale of the second company had led to the failure of the merged
company, as a result of which it discontinued paying the plaintiff several special work
allowances and incentives.”140 The plaintiff established his challenge on the argument that Law
No.203 of the year 1991 stipulated certain economic outcomes which were incompatible with the
socioeconomic principles of the constitution. In other words, this law could lead to the
elimination of public ownership of national wealth. The plaintiff added that Law No.203 of the
year 1991 had removed the clear distinction between public and private ownership.141

In 1997, the Supreme Court rejected the claim of the plaintiff and affirmed the constitutionality
of Law no.203/1991.The Supreme Constitutional Court, in its reasoning, stated that:
1. Constitutional provisions should not be interpreted as a definitive and permanent
solution for outdated economic conditions, but should be understood in the light
of higher values aiming at economic and political liberation of the country and
citizens;
2. Forcible integration of constitutional provisions, within a particular philosophy,
would make it difficult for any particular community to adapt them to new goals
that the community would like to reach;
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3. The interpretation of the character of public investment and the complementarities
between public and private investment is not a violation of the Constitution but is
an appreciation of the values upheld by the Constitution, foremost of which is that
the quality of the investment that should be protected is dependent on the area in
which it operates, and that public and private investments are complementary
partners. In this sense, the offering of shares in units of holding companies in the
stock exchange, even if this offer leads to their sale to the private sector, is not a
reversal of the leading role of public investment, but is one way of protecting
resources that should not be wasted in order to ensure sustainability of
development through cooperation among its partners.142
In fact, the Supreme Constitutional Court’s ruling has triggered a crucial debate among legal
jurists especially concerning the constitutionality of the economic reform.143 Mustapha Al Sayyid
argues that the Supreme Court had abandoned the textual interpretation and relied on a liberal
reading of constitutional clauses in order to reach this interpretation which totally contradicts
with the real intentions of the drafters of the 1971 Constitution.144 Leftists accused the Supreme
Constitutional Court of striking down the 1971 Constitution itself.145 In the same direction, Lama
Abu Odeh argues that “the SCC performed interpretive acrobatics to introduce market economy
in its decisions against the letter of an openly "socialist" constitution.”146 Moreover, according to
Nathan Brown and Julian G. Waller “the Supreme Constitutional Court tended to whittle down
the meaning of socialist provisions in the constitution”147

It is apparent that the Supreme Constitutional Court performed a crucial role in the
implementation of the privatization program since it reinforced the confidence of the political
figures to continue their market transition at a minimal political cost. Without a doubt, the
intervention of the Supreme Constitutional Court helped the government to dismantle the legal
infrastructure of Nasser’s era and the socialist principles of the 1971 Constitution for justifying
the market transition in the 1990s in a way that the government itself did not imagine. The
Supreme Constitutional Court conferred legitimacy to neo-liberal policies. The Supreme
142
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Constitutional Court had removed the most serious legal challenge to the liquidation of the
public sector. No one can deny the interests and policies of the government converged with the
Court's perspective in order to overturn the socialist policies of Nasser's era.

Additionally, the significance of this ruling stems from the reality that the government heard the
call of the Supreme Constitutional Court to intervene and amend the socialist clauses in the 1971
Constitution to match the market transition. In March 2007, Egyptians agreed on the
amendments to the 1971 Constitution. The amendments encompassed about thirty-four articles.
Eleven among them were directed towards achieving compatibility between the prevailing
capitalist market system and the constitutional clauses. The amendments revealed the intent of
the regime to abolish any reference to the socialist economic system.148 For instance, Article No.
4 of the 1971 Constitution after amendment stated that “The national economy is based on the
development of economic activity, social justice, the guarantee of the different forms of property
and the preservation of workers’ rights.”149 The constitutional amendment discloses that the
government responded positively to what the Supreme Constitutional Court said in the
privatization ruling and started to remove any constitutional obstacles that could hinder market
transition.

The executive- judiciary relation was not a constant one in terms of economic policies. As I
mentioned before a constitutional court’s ruling generally cannot be overturned, nevertheless its
impact may be blocked by other two authorities. This is true. The government determines the
extent and the limits of the judicial influence in economic policies. Despite the cardinal role of
the Supreme Constitutional Court in the economic sphere at the era of the transition to a market
economy, the government was worried by the judicial activism of the Court in certain economic
policies. Indeed, the government was negatively affected by the Supreme Constitutional Court’
tax rulings that forced the government to return hundreds of millions of pounds to those who
were dissatisfied with these pieces of unconstitutional taxation legislation.150 Consequently, and
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because the government has the upper hand concerning the efficacy of the public law judge, the
government hindered the influence of the Supreme Constitutional Court rulings in taxes issues.

In 1993, the Court declared the constitutionality of Law No.229 of the year 1989 that imposed
taxation on Egyptians workers in public sector companies abroad in order to increase tax
revenues. The plaintiff, a woman working for the Ministry of Housing abroad, argued that Law
No. 229 of the year 1989 discriminated against Egyptians workers in the public sector while
authorizing Egyptians in the private sector to work abroad without having to pay taxes. The
plaintiff claimed that this law established a form of discrimination between nationals and
therefore violated Article No. 38 of the1971 Constitution, which bases the taxation regime on
social justice. The Supreme Constitutional Court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument and struck
down the law.151

On the same track, the Supreme Constitutional Court struck down other pieces of tax legislation
because they imposed excessive taxation whether on private persons or companies.152 In 1998, as
a result of these rulings, the government started to protect itself from paying compensation in
other pending challenges. Mubarak rendered Law No.168 of the year 1998 to block the impact of
the Supreme Constitutional in taxation sector. This enactment amended Article 49 of the Law
No.78 of the year 1979 of the Supreme Constitutional Court. The amendment foreclosed
retroactive compensation requests as the result of Supreme Constitutional Court taxation
judgments to the party who initiated the claim before the court; however, all other citizens were
deprived of the right to retroactive compensation for the same unconstitutional laws.153 The
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government attempted to justify the legitimacy and legality of the amendment by relying on the
maintenance of social and economic stability.154
The government’s reaction in tax area undoubtedly indicates that the efficacy of the judicial
intervention in economic dilemmas is pending on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the
government with the courts and the judicial decisions. Moreover, the government posses the
upper hand in dealing with the judicial influence in economic issues in Egypt in a way that can
hinder the fate of the courts’ verdicts.

The Supreme Constitutional Court played a prominent role in overturning Nasser-era economic
laws, thereby assisting the government in implementing its privatization program at a minimal
political return. The government privatized several public companies; some through direct sale,
while others were government partnerships with private sector. The administrative judge’s
intervention in the privatization program was evident as will be discussed in the next section.

D. The Era of the State Council (reviewing Neo-liberal economic policies)
Compared to the Supreme Constitutional Court’s perspective that underpinned the neo-liberal
economic era of 1991, the role of the Council of State was extremely different and should not be
overlooked. The Council of State Courts issued at least 11 rulings in the two years following the
2011 Revolution ordering the state to reverse deals signed by the government during the
implementation of economic reform.155 Many Council of State rulings strongly touched the
essence of the economic policies that were undertaken by the government since the 1990s. These
judgments scrutinized the legality of the economic policies and the motives behind their
adoption, which crucially affected the economic stability of the country as a whole.
In the early 1990s, Egypt transitioned to a liberalized capitalist economy. Mubarak’s regime
signed an economic reform and structural adjustment program with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The implementation of privatization through liquidating all
losing public sector enterprises is regarded as the most significant policy among others in terms
154
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of the implementation of this economic reform program. In fact, this privatization program was
implemented without a sufficient constitutional and legal infrastructure regulating its execution
as I mentioned in the previous section.

In this regard, aggrieved workers of former publicly- owned companies , NGOs, and concerned
citizens brought many disputes before the Council of State challenging the legality of the
governmental acts and policies, and selling contracts of public assets to the private sector
whether nationals or foreigners on the grounds that these privatization deals intentionally wasted
the public assets of the country, severely affected the rights of workers of the privatized
companies, and fatally impaired the public interest of the whole country.156
Judicially, the administrative judge’s intervention in reviewing the privatization program was
noticeable. In order to impose its judicial review on neo-liberal economic policies, the Council of
State has relaxed the standing condition in order to widen its jurisdiction to hear cases filled by
aggrieved workers, human rights organizations and legal activists for protecting the public assets
of the country and workers’ rights.
Article No.12 of the Council of State Law states that “a claimant has to prove a personal and
direct interest in the outcome of any legal claim.”157 According to this article, the defendants
companies in most privatizations cases such as Indorama Shebin Textiles, Centamin Gold Mine,
Omar Effandi, and El Nasr Steam Boilers requested the court to declare the case inadmissible
since the claimants had no standing to file the case before the court because they did not have a
clear direct interest in the dispute or relation to the other parties.158 Since there is no
administrative procedural code regulating the proceedings in the administrative litigations, the
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administrative judiciary is a sort of “making law” body regarding procedural matters particularly
those relating to the standing condition.159

Administrative judges benefited from Article No. 12 in order to grant themselves discretionary
power in dealing with the standing condition in privatization cases; however, claimants did not
possess direct and a personal interest in these litigations. The Council of State ruled that
citizenship is a sufficient criterion for granting standing in litigations raised to annul
administrative decisions issued to regulate the transfer of the ownership of public funds to the
private sector. The Court based its argument on Article No. 33 of the 1971 Constitution and its
rendition in Article 6 of the Constitutional Declaration of 2011. The court declared that the
Constitution itself provided “the direct and personal interest” required by law. These articles
stated that “the public fund is for all Egyptians and there is a duty on every citizen to protect
public funds in accordance to law.”160 The administrative judiciary found that the Constitution
provided an explicit mandate for any citizen to use the right to litigate in order to safeguard
public assets against any infringements and corruption; thereby the citizen had a concrete and
confirmed standing and right to file a lawsuit or accept intervention after the initiation of a
case.161

The Administrative judiciary, after having decided that plaintiffs have legal standing to file these
cases, started to scrutinize the legality of privatization program. The Council of State found that
there were many explicit violations and infringements which accompanied the privatization of
public sector companies implemented during the period of Mubarak’s economic reform effort.
Consequently, due to unlawfulness, squandering of public funds, corruption, arbitrariness of
power, and mismanagement and irregularities of the governmental authorities in adopting and
implementing the privatization program, the court characterized the governmental acts and
decisions as null and void. The Administrative Judiciary Court asserted that the administrative
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transgression had diminished the administrative decisions to the point of nothingness, thereby
rendering these privatization contracts null and void.

For instance, in Omar Effandi, the Administrative Judiciary Court asserted that one of the main
features of corruption in the privatization program was the squandering of public funds during
the valuation process of the assets of privatized projects. Accordingly, the Court annulled the
sale of the Omar Effandi Company due to the fact that the valuation process was performed
according to the present value (Discounted Value) rather than the real market value in violation
of the decisions of the Higher Ministerial Committee for Privatization.162

In addition, in El Nasr Steam Boilers, the Court discovered that the valuation of the assets of the
company had been implemented according to void economic standards that led to the wasting of
public funds of the company. The Administrative Judiciary Court ruled that the valuation
committee had adopted irrelevant financial techniques for assessment that lowered the sale price.
The Court stated that the corruption that accompanied the valuation of this company was
overwhelming because the Court revealed that one member of the Board of Directors of the
company who participated in the evaluation committee of the investment was the father of the
new buyers of the privatized assets. That person had improperly used his position to assist his
sons in buying the enterprise at a lowered price; the Court annulled the contract on this basis.163

Finally, in Indorama Shebin Textiles, the Court affirmed that the selection of the Shebin Textiles
Company for privatization, as a company with low profitability, was in gross violation of Public
Business Law and its executive regulation. Based on the documents submitted by the litigants,
The Court affirmed that the company was achieving profitable earnings each year, and did not
suffer any damages since its establishment until 2004; its fiscal condition was both strong and
stable. Ultimately, the Court argued that the selection of the public sector companies that were
candidates for privatization was not established through an economic study and with accurate
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financial statistics, rather it was based on unreasonable decisions by the competent authority
without any economic criteria, and thereby the Court annulled the contract.164

The Council of State Courts stated that the result of the annulment of these contracts was
followed by the restoration of the sold companies to the state according to Article No.142 of the
Egyptian Civil Code. In this way, the previously privatized assets were returned back to the
state.165

Although the Administrative Judiciary Court annulled these privatization contracts; it took the
opportunity to overview and comment on the public economic policies which had been adopted
by the government since 1952 until the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies. The
Court announced that privatization was not an evil which should be averted at all cost nor an
absolute heaven whose way should be paved. However, privatization means that the state
transfers its ownership of public projects to the private sector for improving the economic
efficiency of these projects through relying on the market system and competition and alleviating
the fiscal burdens on the states that suffered from its public assets.

In addition, the court confirmed that the state has to create a smooth and safe climate for
investment, provide the investors with high standards of guarantees, and adopt the decisions
required for the purification of the investment climate from corruption and illegal regulatory
framework.166 It evident that the Administrative Judiciary Court revealed its own perspective
about efficient public economic policy, its legal infrastructure and the effective role that need to
be played by the government during the implementation.
No doubt, the Council of State’s intervention in the monitoring of privatization contracts was
controversial. Although most aggrieved workers and NGOs highly appreciated the State
Council’s judicial activism in addressing the governmental transgressions during the
implementation of the privatization program by the Egyptian government in the early 1990s,
legal practitioners directed criticism towards State Councils judgments on several legal grounds.
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In privatization cases, defendants regularly declared the inadmissibility of the cases being heard
by the Council of State Court when the relevant privatization contract encompassed arbitration
clauses to settle conflicts arising from its implementation.167 However, the Administrative
Judiciary Court had annulled the arbitration clause in most privatization contracts in order to hear
the case; this is in spite of the fact that the meaning of Article 22 of Law No.27 of the year 1994
is explicit and represents a pure application of the kompetenzkompetenz principle.168

In fact, the Council State courts struck down arbitration clauses in privatization contracts relying
on its judicial jurisprudence that considered the Council of State as being the natural judge for
any administrative disputes. For instance, the Court, in Omar Effandi, declared the arbitration
clause null and void by invoking the incapacity of the representative of the holding company to
sign the arbitration clause in an administrative contract according to Article 1of the Egyptian
Arbitration Law.169 In fact the Council of State’s perspective on settling the validity of the
arbitration clause triggered considerable criticism towards the privatization’s judgments
especially because the ordinary judiciary, in contrast, strictly adhered to the rules of Art. 22
deciding the inadmissibility for any dispute relating to the validity of the arbitral clauses.170

In fact, the Administrative Judiciary Court rejected the motions concerning inadmissibility and
jurisdiction in order to pave the way for the annulling and canceling of governmental decisions
167
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that led to the making of sale contracts regardless of the kompetenz kompetenz principle and the
principle of detachment of the contract from the arbitration clause.

In addition, legal scholars criticize the judicial review of the Council of State in terms of the
standard of proof applicable to corruption.171 In fact, the difficulty of privatization litigation
stems from the novelty of this sort of conflict before the Council of State and the fuzzy nature of
the privatization contracts; this can be attributed to the fact that these lawsuits were raised after a
revolution calling for fighting corruption in the executive authority.

In this context, opponents of the State councils’ judgment believe that the Court did not adopt a
clear cut definition for the corruption of the governmental contracts compared to the definition of
corruption in the criminal law arena. The term corruption was used in the privatization litigations
liberally. The Council of State relied on violations of the Public Tender Law and the selling
under market prices to prove the corruption of the privatization transactions between the
government and the investor.172 The critics also strongly blame the State Council judiciary
because it proved the existence of the corruption without identifying whether the second party
investors were personally involved with the officials of the governmental authorities in these
illegal actions or not.173 In addition, although the Council of State declared that the result of the
annulment of these contracts was to be followed with the restoration of the sold companies to the
state, there was great difficulty in deciding how to enforce these judgments on land taking into
consideration that some of the privatized projects were resold again or mortgaged like Omar
Effandi.174

In return, the government was not beyond the scene. The privatization judgments triggered
significant anxiety among economic figures and decision policy makers in Egypt. Without a
doubt these rulings pushed many foreign companies operating in Egypt into a legal and
economic limbo. Many investors felt wary about the investment climate in the state because
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these judgments had led to critical fiscal and economic damages for the owners of the restored
companies.

Since 2012, the Council of State judgments have made the Egyptian Government a party in many
arbitral cases under BIT agreements. Foreign investors moved to ICSID in order to obtain
arbitral awards to gain compensation from the Egyptian authorities_ because of annulment
judgments_ estimated to be worth billions of dollars.175 The government of Egypt was the
respondent in twelve ICSID disputes at the end of 2014. Investors based their claim on the fact
that the Egyptian court system ignored the arbitral clauses embodied in the privatization
contracts and BIT.176

In this regard, Monir Fakry Abdel el Nour, a former Minister of Trade and Investment, declared
that such judgments destabilized the climate of foreign investment in the country which was
already worrisome because of the negative consequences of the 25th January Revolution that had
undermined the Egyptian economy.177 Accordingly, the government felt that it had to intervene
to stop the drain of the economy and to restore the confidence of the foreign investors.

The government restricted the right of citizens to challenge government contracts through
amending the article of protecting public funds in the1971 Constitution. Article No. 22 of the
2012 Constitution shifted the duty to protect public funds from the citizen_ the main rationale for
granting standing in privatization cases_ and placed it on “the society and the State.”178
Moreover such duty had been relinquished because Article No. 34 of 2014 Constitution states
that “Public ownership is sacred and shall not be infringed upon and its protection is an
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obligation practiced in accordance with the law.”179 Besides, the government rendered Law
No.32 of the year 2014 named Regulating Some Procedural Aspects of Challenging Government
Contracts. These constitutional and legislative amendments have a crucial impact on jurisdiction
of the Council of State since it put an end for the judicial review of the Council of State on
government contracts which is examined in the next section.

E. Post 2013 and the End of Judicial Review of Economic Policies?
The government suffered severely from the annulment rulings of the Council of State Courts in
privatization litigations. As a result of that, and to reinforce the investment climate, Law No.32
of the year 2014 was issued by the Former President Adly Monsour, based on the latest
constitutional amendments to manage the challenges to state contracts.
According to Article No.1, this law limits the right to challenge government contracts only for
the parties of these contracts: the investor and the state. Article No. 2 has retroactive impact on
the law and orders of the courts to declare those pending and future cases articulated in Art.1
inadmissible. This means that the law has a direct impact not only on future cases but also
pending cases before the Council of State.180 Consequently, as a result of this law, the Council of
state is obliged by the new legislation. As a form of strict adherence to this legislation, the
Administrative Judiciary Court rendered many judgments inadmissible since cases were filled by
a third party.

Although Law No.32 of the year 2014 helped the government to mollify the outrage of the
investors, it triggered a considerable debate about its crucial consequences on the Egyptian legal
system generally and administrative judiciary specifically. Some legal scholars and NGOs,
particularly the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights strongly criticize the
government for issuing this law, because they believe that the law puts an end to the public
interest litigation for reviewing government transactions under the Council of State jurisdiction
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through depriving citizens from exercising their constitutional right to protect public funds in the
case of infringement or misuse of power by the authority.181

For these reasons, on May 3, 2014 many lawyers and human rights activists resorted to the
Supreme Constitutional Court to challenge the constitutionality of Law no.32 of the year 2014.182
Correspondingly, State Council judiciary abided by Law No.32 of the year 2014 concerning
government contracts, and suspended the proceedings in these sorts of litigations until the
Supreme Constitutional Court judges the constitutionality of this law.183

In this regards, the State Commissioner of the Supreme Constitutional Court issued an official
report about the constitutionality of Law No.32 of the year 2014. The report concluded that the
law is unconstitutional for various reasons. The State Commissioner argues that the issuance of
Law No.32 of the year 2014 in this way contradicts with the right to sue which is stipulated and
guaranteed to all citizens in Article 97 of the 2014 Constitution.184 The report discloses that there
are many categories of people which may be affected by governmental contracts like workers
who are the subjects of the projects of these contracts and other concerned people who have the
duty to maintain the public ownership according to Article 34 of the 2014 Constitution.185

The report also affirms that restricting the right to challenge these sorts of contracts by the parties
alone deprives the citizens of the option of using litigation to safeguard public ownership in
cases of inaction by the state authorities which undermine the citizenship principle and the
sovereignty of the people.186 In this point, the report affirmed that the recent constitutional
amendments cannot be considered as a constitutional backup for the issuance of Law No.32 of
the year 2014. The report also refutes the motives behind the issuance of this law in terms of
protecting the national economy from huge damages and returning the confidence of the foreign
investors and funding institutions. Additionally, the report assures that the motives of the state
181
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cannot be a reason for immunizing governmental actions from judicial scrutiny. Secondly, the
report also argued that the law explicitly undermines the established constitutional jurisdiction of
the Council of State and the ordinary judiciary. The report illustrated that after depriving those
who possess the real interest in challenging these contracts will be without judicial review in the
case of the silence of the parties.187 The report states that the meaning of contract was broad and
comprehensive without a clear specification in a way that exempts the state and its governmental
contracts from being subjected to a law which violates many constitutional principles.

Ultimately, the State Commissioner considers Law no.32 of the year 2014 a clear interference of
the state authorities in judicial affairs and litigation and also clashes with the independence of
judiciary.188 Despite the advisory nature of the State Commissioner, the report put many
constitutional issues in front of the Supreme Constitutional Court that should be answered. Is the
judicial review of the Council of State still suspended in light of the remarks indicated in the
report of the State Commissioner?
It’s worth noting that the Investment Law No.72 of the year 2017 including regulatory
framework for the process of the investment in Egypt was issued.189 This law reduces barriers to
how international companies invest and operate and guarantees a number of protections for
international investors to encourage new development in Egypt. The government hopes to
expand economic growth, increase domestic production, exports and foreign investment, and
enhance good governance and transparency.

In order to immunize this new investment approach, the law has established two quasi judicial
committees for solving investment conflicts. The first is the Ministerial Committee on
Investment Dispute Resolution to scrutinize the hurdles that may hinder the continuity of the
investment relation between the investor and the state.190 The second one is the Ministerial
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Committee on Investment Contracts Dispute Resolution accompanied by certain procedural
regulations in order to negotiate, rectify contract terms and settle disputes that arise between the
state or its institutions and the investor from the investment contracts in order to return
equilibrium to the contract.191 The decisions of the Committee, after the approval of both of the
parties and the prime Ministry, are enforceable and binding for the governmental authorities and
they shall have the executive power.192

Finally, Law No.133 of the year 2019 was rendered. This law authorizes the Prime Minister
submitting requests to committees stipulated in Law No. 72 of the year 2017 concerning the
enforcement of the privatization judgments in order to reach suitable settlement with investors
regardless of what the bench declared.
To sum up, Law No.32 of the year 2014 and Law No.133 of the year 2019 can clearly demarcate
the relation between the government and the judiciary. These legislation are explicit examples to
show the extent to which the government posses the full power to hinder the judicial influence in
economic policies. The government constrained the Council of State scrutiny on the state
economic policies by limiting the right to challenge the legality of government contracts to the
parties of the contracts only. This means that the government puts an end for the judicial review
of the Council of State on government contracts in a way that indicates the dominance of the
government on the judicial influence in economic arena.
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IV.

Conclusion
It should be clear now that the executive- judiciary relation was not a constant one in terms of
economic policies. This paper argues that the judicial influence is pending on the satisfaction or
dissatisfaction of the government with the courts and the judicial decisions. This paper argues
that the government views courts’ judgments according to its own economic policies. The
government will appreciate courts’ judgments if courts confer legitimacy on the controversial
economic policies, or if the judicial intervention is compatible with the government economic
directions, while the government will hinder the impact of courts’ contributions if the courts’
decisions go against its willingness. In that case, the government can reverse court policy
through enacting legislation that deprives courts’ judgments from its crucial effects or restricts
the scope of the judicial review of the public law judge itself.

This paper highlights the legal and economic framework in which public law judges imposed
their judicial review over the public economic policies since the proclaiming of the Republic in
1952 until now. After the 1952 Free Officers' Revolution, the role of the Council of State in
reviewing the economic policies of the government in this period was significantly scarce
because the government adopted socialist policies which were immunized by legislation that
initially deprived the Council of State from adjudicating disputes arising from its
implementation.

Upon its establishment in 1979, the government benefited from the Supreme Constitutional
Courts’ rulings in economic sphere in achieving its desire to reduce the apparent risks regarding
private investment in Egypt as the Court restored the limits of protection of the private property
right. Besides, The Supreme Constitutional Court conferred legitimacy to market transition. The
Supreme Constitutional Court had removed the most serious legal challenge to the liquidation of
the public sector assuring the constitutionality of Public Business Law No.203 of the year
1991that paved the way for policymakers to continue the implementation of the privatization
policy despite its apparent conflict with the socialist philosophy of the 1971 Constitution. This
Court’s approach stimulated the government to intervene and amend the socialist clauses in the
1971 Constitution to be compatible with market transition.
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Alternatively, Council of State’ rulings revealed the deficiencies of the legal framework of
privatization and its improper implementation. To counteract the negative impact of these rulings
on the investment climate, the government issued Law No.32 of the year 2014.This law limits
the right to challenge government contracts only for the parties of these contracts: the investor
and the state. It constrained the judicial overview of the Council of the State in a way that
forecloses the judicial review of the Council of State in public economic policies.
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